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BY NANCY CANTOR • Provost, University of Michigan
The hallmarks of a great research university, and indeed of this institution, are the richness of
its intellectual fabric and the eagerness of its faculty to tap the full wealth of resources as they
push the boundaries of their respective disciplines in pursuit of new and deeper understandings.
Physical boundaries and distances have become less defining because of technological advances
in this increasingly complex and multi-faceted world. So, too, intellectual boundaries must
become more permeable and less rigidly constructed. We have come to understand that only by
viewing issues through multiple perspectives can we hope to fully understand them and arrive at
solutions to the challenges of our times. Today, often the most original, cutting-edge advances in
knowledge emerge from academic work that takes place at the intersections of the disciplines.
Nowhere is the vitality and richness of interdisciplinary work more apparent than at the
University of Michigan Law School. Remarkable for the intellectual depth and breadth of its
extraordinary faculty, the Law School has for several decades been at the forefront among its
peers in the pursuit of interdisciplinary scholarship. The work of the faculty as scholars and as
teachers probes legal issues from a variety of perspectives, reminding us that contemporary
scholarship, as well as a modern education, requires a willingness to cross boundaries, share
sensibilities, and examine the world from multiple angles and through many lenses.
Is there something about law as a course of study that makes it a particularly fertile ground
for interdisciplinary work? Perhaps it is the fact that law extends its reach into all aspects of
society, addressing questions of human relations, fairness, and justice that almost by definition
have no easily knowable answer. The legal method, then, must be one of triangulation - moving
theoretically and empirically closer and closer to an acceptable understanding. As such, legal
understandings recognize the complexity of human behavior, the role that context plays in
shaping what we do and think in everyday life, and, therefore the necessity to look at evidence
and events from many angles and to come to terms with the possibility that multiple plausible
answers may reasonably emerge. Just as the renditions of witnesses sometimes bring to light
alternative portrayals of events, and looking at the past helps in understanding the present, so,
too, does an interdisciplinary approach stretch scholarly understandings. Of course, with this
added detail often come new questions (instead of clear answers), but then that is the mindful
exercise to which we are all committed.
This issue of Law Quadrangle Notes explores the connections between law and 11 other
disciplines through a series of essays by Law School faculty members, all of whom hold
appointments in both the Law School and another of our schools and colleges: Omri Ben-Shahar
(Law and Economics), Phoebe C. Ellsworth (Law and Psychology), Bruce W Frier (Law and
Classics), Thomas A. Green (Law and History), Don Herzog (Law and Political Science), Jeffrey
S. Lehman (Law and Public Policy), Richard A. Lempert (Law and Sociology), Donald H. Regan
(Law and Philosophy), Carl Schneider (Law and Medicine),James Boyd White (Law and English
Language and Literature), and Christina B. Whitman (Law and Women's Studies). These faculty
members were asked to respond to two questions:
• What issue or issues in law does your multidisciplinary expertise help you to examine?
• How do your multiple disciplines add to the discussion?
Their responses to these questions offer a fascinating array of insights into the world of
interdisciplinary inquiry: The effectiveness of an accepted remedy is called into question when it
is considered from the perspective of an economist; the unintended consequences of a court
ruling come to light when it is examined in light of contemporary feminist scholarship;
commonly held assumptions are put to the test of data by scholars trained in a social science as
well as in law. Easy challenges? Certainly not. Yet the results of these inquiries unquestionably
raise the discourse to a new level, leading as they do to a more comprehensive, if less
comfortable, understanding.
In law, as in other disciplines, our students also benefit greatly from an interdisciplinary
approach. The astonishing range of joint degree programs available to law students - the JD.
and an M.B.A, thej.D. and an M.S. in Natural Resources, the JD. and a Master of Arts in
Japanese Studies, to mention just a few - attest to the opportunities afforded students to explore
the world and their understandings of the law from a broader perspective. With what success? In
a series of brief interviews, recent graduates of one of the Law School's 12 joint degree programs
discuss how their interdisciplinary training informs and enriches their professional lives.
This issue presents the University at its best!
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By Omri Ben-Shahar • Assistant Professor of Law and Economics

aw and economics is a methodology that helps answer three types of questions:
•
What effect do legal rules have on individuals' behavior?
•
How should legal rules be designed to increase human well-being?
•
How does the design oflegal institutions affect the content of legal rules?
In the area of private law, where law and economics has its main contribution, the
focus is on the ability of legal rules to create incentives for private parties to behave in
conformity with social goals. How should liability rules in tort law be designed to
promote incentives for care and reasonable safety? What remedies for breach of contract
provide private transactors with sufficient regard for the interest of their contracting
partners? What bundle of ownership rights is necessary to induce creation of new
property by individuals? How do trial procedures and settlement patterns affect the value
of substantive rights?
Economic theory derives most of its analytical prowess from the assumption that
individual decision-makers conduct their affairs in a rational manner, namely, that they
are consistent in their pursuit of their subjective goals and interests. A variety of
economic methods have been imported into law to sharpen our understanding of the
effects that legal rules have on rational actors. The clearer understanding of the incentives
of individuals and the pattern by which they will react to social regulation is important
for the evaluation of rules and their ability to promote any desirable set of policy
concerns. The economist is, in a way, a skepticist who is concerned with the limits of
implementation: how far can legal rules affect private behavior and what are the bounds
of society's power to control individuals?
Exploiting such tools, my own research has demonstrated various patterns of behavior
that are likely to arise under specific legal rules. For example, in a recent paper with
Professor Lisa Bernstein of the University of Chicago ("The Secrecy Interest in Contract
Law," 109 Yale Law Journal 1885), economic analysis was utilized to challenge the
wisdom of prominent contract and commercial law doctrines. Consider a party who
wishes to sue for remedy for breach of contract. Under current law, this party is required
to disclose information about its business operations that is necessary to assess its losses
from breach and its actions to reduce the loss. If this aggrieved party has, for any one of
numerous reasons, a secrecy interest in these operations, it might be reluctant to sue and
undergo the costly scrutiny of its business and the discovery of its private information.
This party might, in fact, prefer to entirely forego the compensatory remedy in order to
protect its secrecy interest. Recognizing this incentive to protect information suggests
that various remedial provisions in the law are ill-suited to provide the relief for which
they are intended. Thus, economic analysis demonstrates that the traditional goal of
contractual remedies - to make the aggrieved party "whole" - may be better served by
remedies such as specific performance and summarily enforced liquidated damages that
do not demand proof of actual loss and do not permit the defendant a broad scope
of discovery.
The economic analysis is employed here, as in many other places, not to prescribe a
social policy, but to better understand the fitness of a particular legal doctrine to achieve
its stated goals. In this or in other areas of law, the normative implications of the
economic analysis may be embraced, or rejected on the basis of other, non-utilitarian
concerns. Either way, the analysis highlights the cost and the feasibility of choosing any
social course of action.
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By Phoebe c. Ellsworth • Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law: Robert B. Zajonic Professor of Psychology
am an empiricist; I believe that when courts and legislatures address empirical questions
about human behavior, their decisions should be informed by empirical research. Courts
and legislatures are faced with such questions every day. Do juries really understand the
facts and the law? When parents divorce, what kind of custody arrang~ment is least
harmful to the children? Why do people favor or oppose the death penalty? How can we
tell when we can trust the testimony of a young child? For that matter, how can we tell
whether an adult's testimony is accurate?
Legal analysts and decision-makers have traditionally addressed questions like these
with rational analysis, intuition, and common sense. What my training in psychology
gives me is a set of systematic techniques for ruling out some answers and confirming
others, for testing my rational analyses, intuitions, and common sense. For example, in
my research on juries I have brought in groups of 12 jury-eligible citizens, shown them a
videotaped trial, and then let them deliberate and try to reach a verdict, just like real
juries. Their deliberations are videotaped, and afterwards I ask them questions to find out
how well they remembered and understood the facts of the case and the judge's
instructions on the law My research, and that of other psychologists who study juries,
shows that juries come to an accurate understanding of the facts. During deliberation they
correct each other's mistakes, and by the end of this process their understanding of the
facts is more complete and accurate than it was at the beginning. However, this is not true
for their understanding of the law. The jurors want to get the law right, they try to get it
right, but they fail, and group deliberation doesn't help.
A critic might argue that these results are untrustworthy, because these were just mock
jurors, not real ones, so maybe they didn't take their task very seriously. One of the
beauties of systematic research is that the scientist's toolkit contains many methods, and
so it is possible to do a second study to compensate for the weaknesses of the first. So I
interviewed real jurors after they had decided real cases, and asked them questions about
the legal instructions they had been given. They were just as confused as the mock jurors.
During the 1990s the jury system was widely criticized, and a number of reforms were
proposed. Systematic empirical research is extremely useful (of course I would say it is
essential) in discovering which of the problems are real and which of the proposed
reforms are effective.
The opportunities for applying empirical methods to legal questions are endless. I have
done research on factors that affect the accuracy of eyewitness testimony, on the reasons
for people's attitudes toward the death penalty, and on the fairness and the quality of
decision making of juries in real cases. The differences between my expertise and that of
my lawyer colleagues make collaboration especially valuable. When two well-trained
people with very different approaches to defining and answering questions work together
on a project, the experience is much more challenging but also much more exciting than
it is when the two people think alike to begin with. It can be frustrating, sometimes even
exasperating, but it is always exciting, and in general I think that multidisciplinary
collaboration results in answers that are both deeper and more comprehensive.
An empirical approach has one other attribute that is rare in traditional legal analysis,
and that is the possibility that the results will show that your ideas were just plain wrong.
For instance, in one study I set out to test the hypothesis that witnesses make many more
false identifications when they are only shown the suspect by himself than when they
have to pick him from a full lineup. Everybody "knew" this, including the Supreme
Court, but in fact there wasn't any research on the question. My plan was to fill this small
gap. Much to my surprise, witnesses made just as many mistakes - or more - with the
full lineup. This unexpected finding led me to new ideas and new research paths that I
would not have been able to conceive if I had not been an empiricist.
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The University of Michigan in
Ann Arbor includes 19 schools and
colleges on four campuses, with
more than 4,200 faculty and nearly
38,000 students. The breadth and
excellence of the institution give
rise to highly regard~d graduate
programs that often attract law
students. The pursuit of a joint
degree is an excellent way for a
student with multiple
,--interests to complete two
C-.1
graduate programs in a
shortened time. Students feel
~
energized by the opportunities
~
and enriched by the different
....,.
academic perspectives and
social atmospheres of two
~
graduate programs. Currently,
,C,
Law School students can
tr:I
choose from the following
tr:I
12 formally established joint
"'a
degree programs:
,C,

S
i:;:;

0

Law and Economics
J.D./Ph.D.

~

i::3:

Law and Business
Administration
J.D./M.B.A.

en

Law and Public Health
J.D./M.H.S.A.
Law and Public Health
J.D./M.P.H.
Law and Public Policy
J.D./M.P.P.
Ph.D., Stanford University
A.B., Harvard College

Law and Information
J.D./M.S.I.
Law and Natural Resources
J.D./M.S.

-------

Law and Social Work
J.D./M.s.w.
Law and World Politics
J.D./A.M.
Law and Japanese Studies
J.D./M.A.
Law and Russian &
East European Studies
J.D./M.A.
Law and Modem Middle Eastern &
North African Studies
J.D./A.M.
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By Bruce-W. Frier • Henry King Ransom Professor of Law: Professor of Classics

"What issue or issues in
law does your
multidisciplinary
expertise help you to
examine? How do your
multiple disciplines add to
the discussion?"

y main field of interest is Roman legal history, and I have a split appointment between
Classical Studies and the Law School. The reason why I find this arrangement so
attractive is that it assists me in bringing to bear on Roman law the particular insights
and methods associated with modem American law.
Roman legal history is a very old academic field, in continuous existence since
approximately 1070 C.E.; and it has profoundly influenced the subsequent
development of the Western legal tradition in continental Europe. This tradition has
been predominantly analytical, and accordingly it has laid little stress on the complex
intersection between law and society within the historical Roman world. One of my
ambitions, still only partially realized but coming to fruition also in the work of my
students, is to "reawaken" the field by examining Roman law through emphatically
new methods. My hope is to create a fresh, more clearly historical approach to these
time-honored legal materials.
The faculty at Michigan does not speak with one voice, obviously; indeed, from
my perspective, one of its great assets is its extraordinary pluralism, with
representatives of almost every major American legal movement during the last halfcentury. Of particular help to me are our various proponents of law and economics
(an approach that is only slowly becoming known outside the United States), of "law
and society" in its various manifestations, and of law and literature. In a series of
books and articles on various aspects of Roman law, I have often made good use of
conversations that I have had with my colleagues on these and other matters.
However, to the extent that the social sciences are implicated in much of my work, it
is also true that I have been able to draw extensively on the extraordinary resources
that this university offers elsewhere.
It is not easy to summarize my work, which is usually aimed at scholars rather
than at a general audience. However, on the most general level, my two books on
Roman law explore the issue of how the introduction of systematic legal thinking
altered the social system of ancient Rome, above all in two ways:
• First, by facilitating modes of legal change that can respond to smaller social
pressures without the clumsy apparatus of the legislative process, an alteration that
increases the social salience of law within society;
• Second, by offering, or seeming to offer, the promise of relatively long-term
social stability and predictability, an alteration that increases a society's capacity to
envisage and effect an evolution toward greater social complexity.
Other articles of mine have dealt with a large diversity of social themes:
• The extent to which the Roman jurists had accurate knowledge about their
social environment;
• The extent to which social pressures can actually be said to have brought
change in Roman law;
• The influence of economic efficiency in shaping legal institutions that are
otherwise difficult to explain through ordinary dogmatic principles;
• The role of language and of linguistic understandings in the shaping of legal
rules; and so on.
Although these articles are directly concerned only with Roman law, they raise, I
hope, larger questions about our understanding of law as a phenomenon within premodem and even modem societies.
Virtually none of this work would have been possible if I had not found, within
the University of Michigan and more especially within its Law School, a place where I
could think freely about the broader legal issues that concern me, but where I could
also draw upon the enormous expertise of my colleagues.
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Associate Professor of Law, Indiana
University Law School, Bloomington
Adjunct Faculty, Political Science,
Indiana University, Bloomington
J.D., University of Michigan
Law School
Ph.D. (Political Science),
University of Michigan
B.A. (Government),
Harvard College

Ph.D., Princeton University
B.A., Trinity College

"I accepted my current job in
large part due to my interactions
during law school with joint
program f acuity. I considered
offers that were in law and in
political science, and I received
career advice from joint degree
f acuity members. While in the job
market, it made sense to seek
their counsel since during law
school I had received mentoring
from joint degree faculty, who
told me about their lives and
having joint appointments.
"I think that my experiences
at the Law School as a person
doing interdisciplinary work were
greatly helped by the f acuity,
especially Tom Green, who has an
appointment in history, and
Phoebe Ellsworth, who has an
appointment in psychology, and
Rick Lempert, a member of my
Ph.D. dissertation committee,
who met with me throughout law
school and understood what it
meant to be pursuing a joint
degree. They were great mentors, who
helped me in the job market and helped
me through the process of making the
decision to choose law.
"The real strength of the program
lies in the faculty who have joint
degrees, and the interest they take in
students who pursue joint degrees.
It's important to note that many f acuity
have Ph.D.s but do not have joint
academic appointments. I think that
Michigan is a very rich interdisciplinary
environment, largely fostered by the
faculty members who have joint degrees."
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By Thomas A Green •

John Philip Dawson Collegiate Professor of Law; Professor of History

am primarily an historian, and in my three decades at Michigan I have mainly taught
English and American legal history to law students, undergraduates, and history students.
With respect to my basic approach, I teach all of these legal history courses pretty much
the same way: as broadly-based history courses. The main difference bet"7een my non-law
and law courses in legal history (beyond the fact that I frequently cover different themes or
periods) is that in the former none of the students knows much about law and in the latter
only some of the students have a background in history: This produces markedly different
teaching experiences - and learning experiences - in which the students are being
stretched in quite different ways. Although much of what I bring to non-law students is
often intrinsically difficult for them to grasp, most of what I bring to law students is not
intrinsically difficult for them but requires them to resist the temptation to think about
legal history mainly in terms of legal doctrinal and institutional matters. Indeed, one of the
questions current historians of law commonly ask is, why have legal elites typically
conceived of the history of law from "inside" the law? If law students can get sufficiently
outside of the law to understand all that the question implies, they are well on the way.
My main scholarly interest is the history of criminal justice in England and America
from medieval times to the present. The particular themes that dominate in my scholarship
tend to appear with some (my students would say obsessive) frequency in my teaching.
They are certainly among the issues that my "multidisciplinary expertise" has led (and
perhaps even "helped") me to examine. Specifically, I have long been interested in two
ideas regarding human freedom: political liberty and free will. Of the two, free will has
been my main concern; my interest in it has often centered on its relationship to ideas and
practices associated with political liberty. To give an illustration: one aspect of my longstanding interest in the history of the criminal trial jury involves the community-based
attitudes that, via the jury, have sometimes served either to constrain or to expand state
power over individuals. Among those attitudes has been, at times, the belief (or intuition)
that particular offenders did not possess the freedom - here, meaning personal agency that the formal law assumed (or was taken to assume) was required for criminal conviction
(or a certain level of punishment). At other times, formal legal rules that defined the
absence - or relative absence - of freedom, and, hence of mens rea, have seemed too
broad and have resulted in successful appeals to jurors to interpret the law narrowly and
thus to perform their "duty" of making those "truly responsible" for harm pay for their
wrongdoing. These divergent social perspectives regarding criminal responsibility have coexisted in local communities and have been given effect on an ad hoc basis, a process that
has resulted in institutional and doctrinal development of differing kinds - some
reflecting resistance to the influence of "non-legal" ideas, some reflecting acquiescence in,
or actual acceptance of those ideas. Yet another closely related example: one of my main
interests in Anglo-American legal thought centers precisely on the role of ideas about
freedom in the history of attempts to justify, criticize, or simply to explain the use of jury
trial. I have often employed analysis of that subject as lead-in to consideration of thinking,
past and present, of jurists and non-jurists, about many other legal doctrinal and
institutional problems regarding the relationship between human free will and
political liberty.
As an historian, I am more concerned with the history and present status of the
phenomena I have briefly encapsulated than with matters of "policy." I am not especially
confident that an historical perspective suggests how best to resolve present legal problems
regarding free will either to make the law more coherent or to reform it in order to make
life in an organized society more coherent, satisfying, fair, or in any other way just. Not
that I regard those ends as unworthy; rather, my interest in the free will problem is related
to my belief that it defies resolution. The history of doctrinal, institutional, social, and
academic practice and debate regarding the free will issue - especially in relation to
10 THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL

J.D., Harvard Law School
Ph.D., Harvard University
A.M., Harvard College
A.B., Columbia University

political liberty - is always enlightening. It is also intriguing,
amusing, depressing, or tragic depending on one's mood of the
moment. It is, for better or worse, a part of history and, in my
view, a large part.
Thus, my study and teaching of history bear importantly on
my study and teaching of law, for many and fairly obvious
reasons. For many years I taught Property and, not surprisingly;
I often focused on the idea of individual initiative (or "labor")
that, in part, underlies (justifies) the idea of entitlement. This
commonly accepted justification often rests, at least implicitly;
on the notion of human free will. Though the same result can
be reached on a purely utilitarian analysis, and that analysis is
sometimes invoked, the actual application of doctrine has
mainly been guided by slowly-evolving freedom-based ideas that
are integral to our social and political culture and our group and
personal psychology. When, in teaching a particular aspect of
property law, I moved from doctrinal analysis, per se, to
discussion of historical context, I tended to focus on one or
another strand of the history of social or political thought since
the late 17th century. I sought in doing so to demonstrate the
degree to which the law is, in one of its guises, an aspect of
intellectual history; and to trace briefly the evolution of those
ideas and interests that have served to contain the deterministic
side of modem thought and have underwritten law's claim through emphasis on human free will - to relative separation
from sheer historical contingency. I should add (or confess)
that, although I was originally trained as a medievalist, I spent
relatively little time in class on the origins and early
development of estates and future interests; no doubt my
students suffered from too little focus on the relationship
between ideas about free will and the doctrine of springing uses.
But one can't do everything.
You might be wondering - if you are still reading this why I taught Property rather than Criminal Law, since the latter
corresponds directly to my field of research and writing. I have
hitherto avoided teaching Criminal Law precisely for the reason
I write about its history; that is, because it raises (for me at
least) the free will issue in an especially fundamental and
compelling, but totally perplexing way. I have no solution to the
deepest problems that strong doubts about the reality of human
free will pose for criminal law, in theory or in practice, and little
taste for replicating the linguistic and philosophical gymnastics
of the many criminal law scholars who have struggled in good
faith both to face the issue and yet avoid the conclusion that the
law (and life) is very possibly meaningless. At current rates,
such a conclusion might well seem unsatisfying to many
students. As it happens, I shall begin teaching Criminal Law
next term. I am not sure what determined me to make that
twilight-of-career choice (not the dean, by the way) or exactly
how I am going to approach the course. If you are curious about
how it went, feel "free" to write me next summer.
LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES FALL/WINTER
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By Don Herzog •

Edson R. Sunderland Professor of Law: Professor of Political Science

'ma political theorist. My specialty is Anglo-American theory, from the 16th century
to today: (Or, if you prefer, I'm a dilettante with poor foreign language skills.) I've
had ongoing interests in liberalism and its critics, in democratic theory, in
pragmatism, and for many years now in constitutionalism and legal thepry: (I cut my
teeth in graduate school trying to persuade Ronald Dworkin that his objections to
H.L.A. Hart depended on misconstruing Hart's position. I didn't succeed, but I still
think I'm right.)
At the Law School, I've been teaching First Amendment. Does a grasp of liberal
democratic theory help me - and my students - get a grip on free speech, free
exercise, and establishment? I confess I'm skeptical. True, the courts sometimes nod
to highly stylized accounts of censorship of the press in early modem Europe, or
religious oppression in England and the settling of the colonies. It would be easy
enough to make fun of this lawyer's office history, threadbare from a scholarly point of
view. But I'm not sure what the point would be, unless one had a decidedly eccentric
account of originalism.
Surely the theory gives us no traction on the wonderfully detailed hard questions
the law routinely has to resolve. The theory is too abstract, fluffy, even flaccid. The
Court has had to decide, for instance, whether the University of Virginia may
withhold funding from a religious student publication while funding nonreligious
student publications. Or whether the University of Wisconsin may compel its
students to contribute to a student activities fund that in tum funds student groups to
which some students have pronounced political objections. I know of nothing in Mill,
in Rawls, or anywhere in political theory that really helps out here. And you don't
need any heavy artillery from theory to understand the basic contours of the
problems, either. Not that "doctrine" and "theory" are antithetical categories or
enterprises. They're mutually supportive, I think. But the theory required has to be
closer to the ground than the stuff political theorists routinely traffic in, worked up
out of the cases, in a way appealing to my pragmatist sensibilities.
Political theory has lots more to say, though, about ongoing debates about the
law. Not because the traditional canon is wiser or more incisive about the very issues
that today's law professors and politicians wrestle with, though now and again that's
true. But because it gives a richer context for grasping what's at stake in the debates.
In a seminar on constitutional interpretation, I rounded up the usual suspects: Bickel,
Ely, Dworkin, Sunstein, Posner, Amar, and so on. I didn't subject my students to
potted lectures on Hobbes, Bentham, and Austin, or the American constitutional
convention, but I tried to show what these disputes are finally about, what deeper
problems are structuring the terrain in ways these recent authors grasp only
tenuously: In a seminar on liberalism and its critics, I do work the students through
some canonical texts by Locke, Montesquieu, and Mill. Turning then to recent legal
writing, they're in a position themselves to assess my routine suspicion that liberalbashing on the left and right depends heavily on accounts of liberalism one might
charitably call caricatures.
I've begun working on torts, which I hope to be ready to teach in 2002. My
immediate instinct is that nothing in political theory about responsibility and liability
is going to supply any traction on concrete legal dilemmas. But the more abstract
debate about whether (or to what extent) tort law does (or should) promote
economic efficiency, or whether it's up to something else, immediately resonates with
centuries-old debates about markets and commodification, about utilitarianism and
rights theory, and the like. So I hope my background in theory will give me a useful
context, or a perch from which to survey and illuminate the legal terrain.
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Assistant Corporation Counsel,
City of Chicago
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Law School
M.S. (Natural Resources Policy),
University of Michigan

B.A. (Science Technology/
Environmental Policy), University
of California-San Diego

A.M., Ph.D., Harvard University
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"After I got my bachelor's
degree I interned at a small naval
base in San Diego and worked in
their environmental department.
Coming off a couple of years of
working experience, primarily in
environmental compliance, I'd
seen a spectrum of things and I
wanted to build on that, but I
wasn't sure that I was going to go
into environmental consulting.
And I definitely wanted to go to
law school. The joint degree
program at the University of
Michigan was a big draw for me.
At the time I saw it as doing
separate things but getting them
done in a short amount of time.
"I'd say it was good for me to
be able to try out both. I was
able, by going back to school
once, to try on two totally
di.fferent hats. By the third year I
was starting to come back to thinking
about being a lawyer. Ifound that I
didn't want to do the policy side of
things, and I was actually more satisfied
doing legal work.
"It~ been good to have been exposed
to many things in school."
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.By Jeffrey s~ Lehman, 'St ·-~ Dean and Professor of Law: Professor of Public Policy
ometimes when I tell people that I hold a joint appointment in law and in public
policy, I am asked, "What's the difference between the two?" It's a very good question.
After all, public policy is ordinarily executed through the instruments of law, and the
primary function of law is to express and implement public policy.
To me, the most important differences between the two disciplines concern the
questions that researchers ask.
In law, the central questions most often involve issues of authority. What is the
status quo in the absence of "legal" intervention? Which organs of government have
the authority to intervene and change the status quo? And when those governmental
organs decide whether to intervene, what sources of law should they take into
account? What authoritative texts? What kinds of "evidence" about the world? What
overarching values and principles?
In policy analysis, the central questions often involve empirical issues. Assuming
one has the power and authority to make a policy decision, what should be the most
important factual predicates for that decision? What do we know about those factual
predicates? How might we learn more about them? What tools from the worlds of
economics and statistics can we use to conduct the inquiry?
The differences in approach can leave people in each discipline talking past the
other. The policy analyst can be baffled when a legal scholar argues that an appellate
court should refuse to consider evidence that was not first presented to the trier of
fact. The legal scholar can be baffled when a policy analyst argues for the investment
of millions of dollars to conduct a study that will almost certainly confirm facts that
"everyone already knows."
During my time in teaching, however, I have found that - at least when things go
well - the two disciplines can be mutually reinforcing, allowing us to see a more
complete picture of a problem than either might have been able to paint on its own.
Let me offer three examples: an article published in a law review, a chapter published
in a policy book, and the classroom.
After I joined the faculty, my first law review article analyzed the Michigan
Education Trust, a program created by the State of Michigan to allow parents to
"prepay" their children's college tuition while they were still very young. The article
argued that the designers of the program had made overly aggressive assumptions
about the tax laws, and that the consequence was that the program could engage in
significant redistribution of wealth within the state. Some parts of the article were
traditional exercises in doctrinal analysis of the federal tax laws. Other parts of the
article, however, departed from the traditional law review style and used data from the
Census Bureau and the Treasury Department to develop an empirical model of the
program's distributional impact. Each part contributed to a complete understanding of
the program.
Several years later, the editors of a book on antipoverty policy asked me to write a
chapter on the subject of urban policy. In traditional policy analytic style, much of the
chapter reviewed and analyzed various studies of different experiments in urban
policy. The second part of the chapter, however, drew heavily on my legal training. It
developed the idea that urban policy should be considered in the context of a general
societal aspiration: that each citizen have opportunities for geographic and social
mobility through employment. It was helpful to think about how the rationale for
laws against discrimination in housing and employment, and our experience with
those laws, help to frame our understanding of programs such as "empowerment
zones."
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In my classes on tax law, my public policy
training has added in small ways to a course that is,
for the most part, a traditional introductory tax
course. But interdisciplinarity is the ,hallmark of an
experimental course that I teach jointly with
another faculty member from the Ford School of
Public Policy, to a class that enrolls students from
both disciplines. The class considers the origins and
consequences of the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996the welfare reform statute adopted by Congress at
the end of the first Clinton administration. The
course readings draw on a broad range of sources,
from legislative materials and Supreme Court
decisions to empirical studies of welfare recipients,
in an effort to give students a well-rounded
understanding of the law's impact.
I have no doubt that academic training in any
discipline helps to shape one's perspective on the
world. Training in two disciplines can help to
ensure that one approaches every problem from at
least two perspectives. And it is probably the lawyer
in me that tells me it is good to nurture the habit of
approaching problems from multiple perspectives in
whatever ways we can.

J.D., University of Michigan Law School
M.P.P., University of Michigan
A.B., Cornell University
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By Richard 0. Lempert, '68 •

Francis A. Allen Collegiate Professor of Law; Professor of Sociology

y extra legal training in sociology informs almost everything I write about, no matter
what the topic. My first major article, for example, was a criticism of two cases in
which the U.S. Supreme Court had approved of reductions in the size of state
criminal and federal civil juries from 12 to 6 persons. A lawyerly criticis:r;n of these
cases might have begun by looking at the framers' understanding of how juries
should be constituted, and, if the framers had conceived of juries as having 12
members, would have chided the court for ignoring the framers' intent. I did look
historically and was delighted to come up with evidence supporting my hunch about
the framers' intent, such as a statement by Virginia's Governor Randolph, speaking at
his state's ratifying convention, "There is no suspicion that less than 12 jurors will be
thought sufficient." But I did not stop there.
The Court had rested its decision largely on the proposition that there was "no
discernable difference" between the decisions of 6- and 12-person juries and had cited
several social science studies in support of this proposition. My methodological
training in sociology allowed me to recognize not only serious methodological
weaknesses that meant that none of the cited studies offered more than feeble support
for the Court's position, but also to point out that because many tried cases were not
close on the facts, even well-designed studies were unlikely to spot verdict differences
that might well occur. Then, again taking a lawyer's perspective, I argued that those
cases where jury size might well make a difference were likely to be cases of special
significance to the legal system because they were likely to be cases where the
presence of minority viewpoints on juries were particularly important to fair, wellreasoned decisions. Finally, I turned to social-psychological studies of small groups,
some of which I had encountered as a graduate student, and to statistical models to
show that for the kinds of problems jurors worked on, larger groups were likely to
perform better than smaller ones. My article, together with the work of several social
psychologists who wrote on the problem of jury size, seemed to play a role in
stemming what, at the time, seemed to be a stampede toward small juries, and was
later cited several times by the Supreme Court when it refused to countenance
criminal juries of fewer than six persons.
Another example of how my work blends legal analysis with social science is an
article I wrote called "Desert and Deterrence: An Evaluation of Moral Bases of the
Case for Capital Punishment." The first part of the article, which deals with "desert,"
is lawyer stuff. Although the arguments it considers are more philosophical than legal,
the philosophical issues are ones that legal scholarship has long pondered and that
many law students are exposed to in first-year criminal law courses. The second part
of the article, which concerns deterrence, is social science. In it, I reviewed every
empirical discussion of the deterrent effects of capital punishment that I could find,
and I closely critiqued what was, when I wrote, regarded as the strongest empirical
evidence that capital punishment deterred. My critique, together with several other
social science critiques that I drew on, shows the fundamental flaws in the study, and
allowed me to criticize the Supreme Court majority in Fireman v. Georgia for citing
this study for the proposition that the social science evidence on capital punishment
and deterrence was sufficiently divided that the matter need not figure in
judicial analysis.
As a final example, I have written twice on issues relating to affirmative action.
The first article, apart from its brevity, is in many ways ordinary legal scholarship. It
takes off from a case, United Steel Workers v. Weber, and analyzes language of the
majority and the dissent to show that the majority's reasoning is better justified. But
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even here, I was influenced by social science scholarship, this time on how language
acquires social meaning. More recently, working with two colleagues, David
Chambers and Terry Adams, '72, I have been examining how Michigan's minority
graduates, many of whom have benefited from special consideration at the admissions
stage, fare, relative to Michigan's white graduates after they enter law 'practice. (The
report, "Michigan Minority Graduates in Practice: The River Runs Through Law
School," appears in the June 2000 issue of Law and Social Inquiry. A briefer discussion
appears in the Summer 1999 issue of Law Quadrangle Notes under the title "Doing
Well &: Doing Good.") This study is pure social science, as we were committed to
meeting rigorous social science standards for empirical research and used social
science methods, such as O.L.S. and logistic regression, in analyzing our data. But we
believe that our major findings bear importantly on the legal debate. Our results
reveal that Michigan's minority graduates appear to be as successful as its white
graduates in their post-law school careers. They also indicate that LSAT scores and
college grades, credentials that opponents of affirmative action take to be strong
evidence of merit, tell us virtually nothing about the capacity of competing white and
minority applicants to succeed in the practice of law, although as admissions
credentials they favor the admission of whites to the exclusion of most minority
applicants. To put this another way, if we were talking about hiring decisions rather
than law school admissions, and if the performance criterion was practice success
rather than law school grades, it would probably be illegal for Michigan, under
Grills v. Duke Power to favor a white over a minority applicant because the former had
the higher LSAT score and undergraduate grades. Seen in this perspective, using racial
diversity as a criterion of law school admissions, as permitted by Bakke, serves not
only to advance educational values, but also to alleviate the ultimately unjustified
racial impact of criteria that do not predict to practice success.
I know on some law faculties there are people with a dual commitment to law
and a social science who report frustration because they are neither fish nor fowl, by
which they mean they feel marginal to both their disciplines. I tell them that at
Michigan things are different. From the start, when Michigan agreed to appoint me
part-time and provided summer money so that I could complete my sociology and
dissertation research, I have felt both supported by the Law School and respected by
my colleagues here. The same is true of the Sociology Department, which I joined
with tenured status in 1985 and recently chaired. I have never felt caught between
law and sociology, or sensed that I was less well thought of in one field because of my
interest in the other. I think an important reason why I have felt respected for my
work in both fields is that at the University of Michigan Law School I am not special.
I have many colleagues who are as interdisciplinary as I am, and are seen as making
valuable contributions to the Law School precisely for this reason. I have other
colleagues who don't have any interdisciplinary background, but who nonetheless do
sophisticated work across disciplinary boundaries. For people like us, I do not believe
there is a better law school than Michigan.

A.B., Oberlin College
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Donald H. Regan • William w. Bishop Jr. Collegiate Professor of Law: Professor of Philosophy
have been asked for an essay of 500-1,000 words on the question "What issue or
issues in law does your multidisciplinary expertise help you to examine? How do
your multiple disciplines add to the discussion?" I don't have 500-1,000 words to say
about that. Indeed, I don't have anything at all to say about it. My non-l~w
appointment is in philosophy. I don't teach what is standardly thought of as the
philosophy of law. Nor am I one of those constitutional lawyers who regard
constitutional law as merely political philosophy under another name. Indeed, I often
describe myself as having multiple academic personalities - not, I hope, a "disorder."
Sometimes I am a lawyer doing constitutional law or trade law; sometimes I am a
philosopher doing moral and political philosophy. And I like it that way. Of course, I
am at all times me, with the mental habits and inclinations I have developed over 55
years of training and work in a variety of disciplines. My constitutional law students
sometimes complain that my course is too "philosophical." But so far as I can tell, all
they really mean is that I like arguments to be made as explicitly and precisely as
possible, and that I seem to care more about this than most of their other teachers.
Since they know I am a philosopher, they attribute this predilection to my philosophy
background. Perhaps they are right - although I myself should not like to suggest
that philosophers have a monopoly on concern for clear thought.
Ironically, the non-law training that seems to me to have the most immediate
and obvious impact on my legal work is the graduate degree in economics I did after
law school. There are a few basic concepts pioneered by economists - the prisoners'
dilemma, Pareto optimality, externalities, and so on - that ought to be in every
educated person's conceptual tool kit, and that certainly ought to be in every lawyer's.
I have never been tempted to add on the personality of an academic economist, but
having done the early stages of their professional training probably makes me more at
ease with some of their basic concepts and less likely to be intimidated by
overreaching claims than most non-economists. Indeed, I would happily claim to
have a better working grasp on the meaning and importance of "efficiency," that
talisman of the law-and-economics set, than many law-and-economists do.
In my case, which may be unusual, the importance of my non-law training and
commitments is not in specific contributions they make to my work in law. Rather, it
is in their contributions to my being me. For better or worse.

18

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL

Associate, Mayer, Brown & Platt,
Washington, D.C.
J.D., University of Michigan
Law School
M.A.E. (Masters of Applied
Economics), University of
Michigan
Joint Degree: B.A. (Economics)
and B.A. (Philosophy),
Pepperdine University

LL.B., University of Virginia
Ph.D., University of Michigan
B. Philosophy, Oxford University
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"After graduatingfrom
Pepperdine, I was an analyst
doing transfer pricing analysis, a
particular aspect of international
tax that is heavily influenced by
economics and economic analysis.
Working around tax lawyers, and
having an interest in law in
general, I went on to law school.
"I pursued the economics
largely for my own edification
because I enjoyed economics and
enjoyed studying economics, but
also because economics is just
really an insightful approach for
understanding human behavior.
Economics really can contribute a
great deal to understanding the
motivations that lie behind the
parties in a case. There3 a great
deal of overlap, theoretically
certainly, but also practically, between
law and economics.
"It became clear to me that I had
an interest in tax law, especially
international tax. So I was able to
parlay my experience with transfer
pricing into a career as a tax lawyer.
My economics background has very
much helped me in the kind of price
transfer analysis that I do now."
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Chauncey E. Stillman Prof_e~sor of Ethics, Morality, and the Practice of Law:
Professor of Internal Medicine

aw professors commonly live their lives thinking about the theories and doctrines that
should animate the law. Being appointed to a medical faculty puts the law professor in
the unaccustomed position of being surrounded by the people the law seeks to
regulate, people who are not always charmed by the law's wiles or even ,rs wisdom.
This is salutary. My medical colleagues are frankly and even fiercely skeptical of
the law's theories and passionately interested in how law actually works in
practice. And, unlike most law professors, they are willing to try to find out what the
law means in real life by systematic, empirical investigation. This is inspiring. My
scholarship is a different - and richer - thing for it. It compels me to ask better
questions and challenges me to find better answers.
Let me, as my medical colleagues like to say, cut to the chase by describing a
project that illustrates what I am saying. Perhaps the legal centerpiece of bioethics is
the doctrine of informed consent. When I proposed to write about it, my medical
friends asked me what made me think I knew anything about how it worked. I asked
them what they could do to help me find out. They said, whatever I wanted. I began
by spending a month observing in an intensive care unit. I watched as the attending
physician and his residents struggled to understand what "informed consent" meant
in the case of a man who came into the unit "severely obtunded" and "experiencing
fulminant hepatic failure." That is, his liver had suddenly stopped working, and he
was virtually unconscious. He was accompanied by his wife, who was at least
inebriated. She demanded that he be treated aggressively. Soon thereafter, another wife
showed up. She announced he was a Jehovah's Witness, and she denounced the
proposed treatment because it involved blood transfusions. Pressed, she conceded
that he wasn't exactly a Jehovah's Witness yet, but she insisted he was about to
become one. So what's a doctor to do?
I moved on to a kidney dialysis unit. I was welcomed with the most astonishing
generosity. I started off interviewing doctors, nurses, social workers, dieticians,
patients, and patients' family members. I soon found myself observing every aspect of
the unit's sad and stirring work. I sat in on an interview in which a gentlemen was
told that his kidneys were failing. He was asked please to choose which kind of
dialysis he would prefer. He listened politely and announced that he really didn't care
as long as he could still go bowling. Bowling? Yes. Certainly. Bowling. Wouldn't he
like to hear his options? Could he go bowling with any of the methods? Oh yes. Then
he would really be content with whatever method you medical types preferred. Now
could we talk about something more interesting? So what's a doctor to do?
Then I rounded at a hospital. Mr. Allworthy was an elderly gentleman of a sweet
and commendable nature. He had multiple embolisms and an aortic aneurysm. Either
could be quickly fatal. The treatment for one bid fair to exacerbate the other. Dr.
Knightly and his flock had for several days been administering tests to get a better
sense of the problem and the solution. We entered Mr. Allworthy's room and said
good morning. He said good morning and praised the hospital's fine breakfast. (I said
he had a sweet nature.) Dr. Knightly lucidly reviewed Mr. Allworthy's complicated
situation. Mr. Allworthy listened tolerantly. Dr. Knightly asked if Mr. Allworthy had
any questions. Why no. Did Mr. Allworthy approve of the treatment plan? Why yes,
whatever you fellows want to do. Did Mr. Allworthy understand what his problem
was? Why yes, I have thick blood. So what's a doctor to do?
I then discovered that it has become a cultural disgrace for an upper-middle-class
American to become seriously ill and not write a book about the experience. There
are literally hundreds of these memoirs of illness. They are a fountain of information
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about what it is like to be sick, about what
it means to be a patient, about what the ill
want. I read as many of these as I could
get my hands on, although I could endure
only a few at a time, so dark were
their stories.
When I returned to the law of informed
consent, all these experiences were a lamp
unto my feet, and a light unto my path.
They were a testimony to the implacable
complexity law confronts. They were a
river of insights and illustrations. Perhaps
most of all, they were a lesson in the way
law affects lives. I believe - I hope that they give a vividness and liveliness to
the book they inspired (The Practice of
Autonomy: Patients, Doctors, and Medical
Decisions) it could have attained in no
other way. I know they have convinced me
never to undertake another substantial
project that does not centrally ask how the
logic of the law confronts the experience
of life.

J.D., University of Michigan
Law School
B.A., Harvard College

"My interest in pursuing the
J.D.IM.B.A. grew out of my
interest in pursuing a career in
management. I served as director
of a not-for-profit volunteer
community service organization
in Los Angeles after college and
realized that management was
my passion. I also worked as a
paralegal and realized very
quickly that the skills that I was
developing through my work in
the law - like time
management/project
prioritization, oral/written
communication, and client service
- would be invaluable in my
management career. More
importantly, Ifelt they were skills
best learned in a legal
environment.
"Pursuing a].D./M.B.A. has
worked wondeefully for me. It has
afforded me opportunities as a summer
associate that were not available to
others. I have been given assignments
with greater responsibility, that provide
me with a larger role in the transactions
of which I am a part, and offer greater
client contact. The bad news is that
coupled with that increased
responsibility is an expectation that I
perform at a higher level and at a faster

pace.
"I remain willing to face the
challenges and reap the rewards that my
joint degree has afforded me. Besides, as
my mother reminds me, if all of this
fails to work out, I still have time to go
to medical school."
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t is a major tendency of legal studies in our time to focus upon questions of general
social policy, with argument centered on which theory or methodology ought to
determine such matters. My own attention has been differently focused, on the nature
and quality of legal thought itself, and of legal expression. It is to these µiatters that
the work I do with the humanities - literature, classics, philosophy, and translation
- mainly speaks.
One way to put this is to say that I am in the first instance interested in law from
the point of view of the person engaging in it, as practitioner, judge, or teacher. And
whether we are aware of it or not, we are all faced with the question: What does it
mean to use this language and this set of institutions to address a problem that has
arisen in the real world? What does it mean, that is, to think and speak as a lawyer?
How can this be done well, or badly, and with what intellectual, ethical, and practical
consequences?
This set of questions, in one sense innocent enough, quickly leads to others, of
deep difficulty. The lawyer uses legal language; this is how she thinks; indeed, it helps
shape her mind and imagination; how then is she to make it the object of her own
critical attention, how is she to judge it as a system of thought and expression? What
is she to do about the points at which she finds it wanting: How, and with what
confidence, can she become a maker, or remaker, of her language? This line of
thought may involve her in thinking more generally about the relation between
language - any language - and the experience it purports to describe or regulate;
about the proper relations among languages, say those of law and some other field of
expertise and learning, such as psychology or economics; and about the ethical and
political significance of particular intellectual and rhetorical practices (such as legal
argument itsel0.
On such questions as these I believe it is useful to bring to bear the best work we
can find, in whatever field, both as a way of discovering instances by which we might
measure work in the law, our own and that of others, and as a way of providing a
place outside the law from which the language and practices of the law might be
examined. I cannot in two paragraphs explain how I do this, but I can at least say that
it is with hopes such as these that I turn, say, to Plato and Thucydides, Emily
Dickinson and Robert Frost, Edmund Burke and Jane Austen, all of whom make their
language the object of critical and creative thought, all of whom concern themselves
with the ethical or political meaning of particular acts of expression.
The study of literature and the other humanities is helpful in large part because it
trains us to focus our attention in certain ways:
• On the meaning of what is said by particular speakers in particular contexts;
• On the way in which a language or set of generic conventions - like those
governing the form of the sonnet or the novel, the judicial opinion or legislation
- commits us to one way of imagining the world or another, making certain
claims of significance possible, others impossible;
• And on the way in which the use of language is an inherently ethical and political
activity, as we define both ourselves and those we speak about in what we say.
To learn to think about these things well, if we could manage it, would not dictate
particular legal rules or result in particular cases, but it would greatly improve the
quality with which the law is made and practiced, and in this sense be of the largest
social significance.
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"I have no doubt that the
skills that I have gained in my
scientific discipline will make me
a better lawyer. In my mind
there~ quite a parallel between
what you do in the two fields.
There~ a conceptual link between
the two. Sdentists approach
problems, conduct research, and
structure arguments very much
like lawyers. At the same time,
I have also learned to think about
problems and issues very
differently than most lawyers. I
have two ways of thinking about
things, not just one.
"My scientijk background is
not only useful in terms of an
approach to the law, but it~ also
something that comes up as a
substantive matter in cases.
There is, for example, a great
deal of science and sdentijk work
in litigation. My scientijk background
will help me to combine the skills of a
lawyer with an understanding of the
substance and minutia of a case."
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By Christina B. Whitman, '7 4 •

Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law;
Professor of Women's Studies

omen's Studies, like law, is deeply interdisciplinary. Its central methodology is simply to
ask the feminist question: "What is the significance of this for women?" The answer is
inevitably complex because women live varied lives. Any disciplinary tool that helps us
understand this complexity is welcomed. Law serves as both a tool of analysis and a
subject of interrogation. Asking about women does not lead to simple answers. It
complicates the legal project of determining rights and responsibilities.
Any lawyer can identify the most obvious achievements of asking "the woman
question" of law. One example is the Nineteenth Amendment, a feminist achievement.
Another, more recent, is the disappearance of explicitly gender-based job segregation. In
other areas asking about the impact of a legal rule on women's lives has revealed aspects
of the problem that had been overlooked but seem obvious once described. We have
come to understand how critical a woman's control over her reproductive life is to her
ability to live on terms of equality with men. We have become skeptical about relying
upon the preferences of women to justify confining them to low-paying, low-status
positions. We now see coercion in sexual situations that would have been thought to be
consensual a generation ago. We no longer look at pornography as merely the
exuberant speech of a rebellious male spirit; we notice the woman who is depicted, too,
and her silence.
Women's Studies draws on interpretive disciplines that uncover gender bias in
doctrines and descriptions that previously seemed neutral. For example, an historical
survey of the tort law of emotional injuries reveals its origins in 19th century cases that
describe a husband's stake in marriage as material and a wife's as purely emotional.
Emotional injury claims were initially more easily recognized when they were brought
by women, but they still are disfavored in a way that may be due to their association
with "the weaker sex."
Often, asking about women reveals how limited the tools of law are when addressing
deep inequalities. Thoughtful feminism, like thoughtful economics, reveals the
unintended consequences of using law to achieve social change. Even when a violation
of the law seems clear, it can be difficult to find a remedy that furthers the interest of all
women. Take, for example, the litigation involving state military colleges that led to a
U.S. Supreme Court decision in United States v. Virginia. The use of state funds to
support institutions of higher education that are completely closed to women made this
a clear case of gender discrimination. Most of the Supreme Court agreed, but the
justices, and feminists, disagreed on the appropriate solution. Unlike the justices,
feminists ask which remedy would best improve the status of women.
The Court ordered the Virginia Military Academy to admit women. The hard
question, which feminists debate and the Court left unanswered, is over the terms of
that admission. The Court took an equal-access approach, reminiscent of the early
1970's jurisprudence associated with the opinion's author,Justice Ginsburg. It opened
the doors of the academies "on behalf of ...women" who could succeed in an
environment that rewarded aggressive behavior and upper-body strength. In the absence
of a comparable state institution geared to leadership training for women, a state must
permit women to enroll in the male academy. This formal equality solution insists only
that women be permitted to participate if they can meet male standards. Women who
fail to conform to the male model can be excluded.
To other feminists, however, gender discrimination at VMI was not merely a question
of exclusionary admissions policies. What troubled them is state support for a deeply
stereotypical view of male-female behavior. If the goal of anti-discrimination law is
equality of citizenship, this argument goes, institutions based on gender stereotypes
should be closed, or the stereotypical behavior should be eliminated in favor of citizensoldier training that assumes many students will be women.
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In a response that has become a refrain
throughout feminist jurisprudence, still other B.A. and M.A., University of Michigan
feminists responded that closing or
redesigning VMI for this reason would itself
perpetuate a stereotypical view of women as
unsuited for military life. The more radical
solution, these women argue, is consistent
with the Court's formal approach: Admit
women on exactly the same standards as men
and subject them to exactly the same
requirements. Subject them to adversative
education and barracks life. Shave their
heads. Make no accommodation. The
disappearance of women into bodies made
anonymous by uniforms and baldness, and
women's success under these conditions,
would pose the deepest challenge to our
assumptions about gender. From this
perspective, law should be used to eliminate
not only gender-based lines but the very
existence of gender categories.
The first of the feminist solutions would
open the public world to more
women. The second would make the world
safer for unconventional women. Either
choice would leave some women vulnerable,
yet lawyers, unlike theorists, cannot avoid
choosing.

"Before I went back to school
I was a research associate in
medical ethics at the American
Medical Association, so I knew at
that time that I wanted to do
healthcare law and wanted to
deal with aspects of patient care,
genetics, and clinical research
issues. So to gain credibility in
the healthcare world, I thought it
was important to have a
healthcare-oriented degree in
addition to my law degree. I
wanted to have the skills to weigh
in on the legal issues.
"One of the things I like about
the fact that I've straddled
healthcare and law is that I can
speak with patients and put them
at ease about the law, whereas
people usually get anxious when
they deal with a lawyer. I can get
them to see that lawyers may be
helpful At the School of Public
Health, there were always people
waiting for me to play the lawyer,
and I like to do so by bringing in
informatiun to provide people
with different perspectives, and actually
help them understand where positions
are comingfrom.
"Healthcare is becoming highly
regulated, access issues are becoming
more important, and those issues often
involve people with the law. Hopefully,
I can help them."
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